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Abstract 
Using data from the UN World Population Prospects, we document global trends in 
lifespan inequality from 1950 until 2015. Our findings indicate that (i) there has been a 
sustained decline in overall lifespan inequality, (ii) adult lifespan variability has also 
declined, but some plateaus and trend reversals have been identified, (iii) lifespan 
inequality among the elderly has increased virtually everywhere, (iv) most of the world 
variability in age-at-death can be attributed within-country variability. Such changes have 
occurred against a backdrop of generalized longevity increases. Our analyses suggest that 
the world seems to be facing a new challenge: the emergence of diverging trends in 
longevity and age-at-death inequality among the elderly around the globe – particularly 
in high-income areas. As larger fractions of the world population survive to more 
advanced ages, it will be necessary that national and international health planners 
recognize the growing heterogeneity that characterizes older populations. 
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Introduction 
Living long and healthy lives is among the most highly valued and universal human goals, 
so the unparalleled longevity gains recorded all over the world during the last decades is 
a cause for celebration. While a huge body of scholarship has shed considerable light on 
the ‘efficiency part’ of the process (i.e. the global, regional and country trajectories in life 
expectancy over time are very well documented; see Riley 2001, 2005), much less is 
known about the ‘equality part’. Since mortality can arguably be considered as the 
ultimate measure of health, lifespan inequalities should be seen as the most fundamental 
manifestations of health disparities. Indeed, the existence of very unequal length of life 
distributions might go beyond purely natural causes and could be indicative of an unfair 
state of affairs in which some population groups might be disadvantaged or discriminated 
against. For this reason, the study of lifespan variability has attracted a great deal of 
attention from demographers and other social scientists, particularly during the last 
decade or so (see, among many others, Edwards and Tuljapurkar 2005; Smits and Monden 
2009; Engelman et al. 2010; Vaupel et al. 2011; Nau and Firebaugh 2012; Edwards 2013; 
Van Raalte and Caswell 2013; Gillespie et al. 2014; Van Raalte et al. 2014; Muszyńska 
and Janssen 2016; Sasson 2016; Seligman et al. 2016; Timonin et al. 2016).  
Studies on lifespan disparities usually focus their attention on differences occurring either 
between or within countries. The former approach typically compares the average health 
performance among a cross-section of countries (most often by comparing the 
corresponding life expectancies) and aims at understanding why population health is 
better in some countries than in others (e.g. Anand and Ravallion 1993, Preston 1975, 
Moser et al. 2005). In contrast, the latter approach explores the lifespan differences that 
might exist among the individuals within a given country. Surprisingly, the study of 
global lifespan inequality (henceforth referred to as GLI) – that is: the study of variations 
in individuals’ lifespan both within and between all world countries (henceforth WLI and 
BLI, respectively) – is largely underdeveloped; so far, it has only been analyzed in a 
couple of studies either using one or two cross-sections in time (see Smits and Monden 
2009 and Edwards 2011). Despite its importance, our understanding of how the different 
types of inequalities are articulated into a coherent whole and how their relationship 
evolves as the demographic transition unfolds is still in its infancy – an issue we aim to 
address in this paper. For the first time, we document the joint evolution in within country, 
between country and global lifespan inequality during the period spanning from 1950 to 
2015, and we investigate in detail the relationship between these trends and the advances 
in longevity that are sweeping the world.  
There are many reasons to be interested in the study of global trends in length of life 
inequality. First, from a practical perspective we now have the possibility to do so. Not 
long ago, the set of life tables needed to conduct comparative analyses across and within 
world countries for long time periods was very difficult to access for researchers. Second, 
from an ethical perspective, if all human beings are entitled to equal rights, egalitarian 
concerns should apply equally at the national and global levels (e.g. should we tolerate 
individual’s lifespan prospects to be determined by their country of birth?). Third, the 
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study of global inequalities allows us to see how the world has changed – often in 
fundamental ways – and to study the hotly debated consequences of economic 
globalization or other global phenomena affecting the living conditions of all human 
beings. Last but not least, exploring how age-at-death differentials jointly evolve within 
and between countries can throw considerable light on our understanding of human 
mortality processes and improve the quality of national and international public health 
policies. 
An analysis of global lifespan inequality must necessarily take into consideration the 
unprecedented demographic transformations undergone by the world and its regions since 
the 1950s. On the one hand, the unfolding of the demographic and epidemiological 
transitions during more than six decades have dramatically changed world countries’ 
population structures. While the prevalence of infant mortality was particularly high 
among most world countries in the mid-20th century, nowadays childhood and 
reproductive-age mortality have shrunk considerably, thus moving age-at-death 
distributions to more advanced ages. On the other hand, country-specific life expectancies 
and the corresponding population shares (which in turn are affected by differential 
population growth trajectories) strongly influence global trends in lifespan inequality. To 
gauge the specific effect that such structural changes have had on lifespan variability 
across and within countries we incorporate the following analytical strategies. First, we 
study lifespan variability not only across the entire age range, but also across adult and 
more advanced age ranges (for convenience, the last two ranges comprise the ages above 
15 and above 65, respectively[[[Endnote#1]]]). As suggested in previous studies, there 
are good reasons to separate childhood, adult and elderly mortality (Edwards and 
Tuljapurkar 2005, Smits and Monden 2009, Engelman et al 2010, Edwards 2011). 
Second, we resort to well-known and newly developed inequality decomposition 
techniques that allow going beyond purely descriptive results and analyze what factors 
are the most important drivers of lifespan dispersion and its evolution over time. Inter 
alia, we run several counterfactual analyses to identify the influence that countries’ 
relative population size, longevity and within country lifespan inequality have had on the 
dynamics of global lifespan inequality. 
The empirical analysis relies on the latest version of United Nations’ World Population 
Prospects (WPP) for the period from 1950 to 2015. The huge geographic coverage of the 
database (195 countries) allows performing global, regional and country-level analyses 
over time. Based on this data source, this paper aims to (i) document levels and trends in 
longevity and lifespan inequality for overall, adult and elderly mortality in the world and 
its regions; (ii) decompose global lifespan inequality in its within- and between-country 
components and assess what the corresponding contributions are; and (iii) examine the 
potential sources of lifespan inequality and evaluate whether poorer countries are 
following the footsteps of their richer counterparts or show diverging mortality 
trajectories.  
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Why is lifespan inequality important? 
The relevance of studying differences in life expectancy across countries is 
unquestionable. But why should one be interested in measuring lifespan variability? The 
study of variations in age-at-death is important both for theoretical and practical reasons. 
As reviewed in the following section, such study can generate valuable insights for a 
proper understanding of the present and future dynamics in human mortality (e.g. the 
‘mortality compression’ and ‘shifting’ hypotheses). In addition, the uncertainty 
associated with larger lifespan inequality, is likely to exert an influence on individuals’ 
beliefs and behavior (Edwards 2013). From a practical perspective, even if differences in 
life expectancy across groups constitute the primary and most commonly reported form 
of lifespan inequality, they do not explain the whole story by failing to explain what is 
happening within groups. In this regard, larger lifespan inequality might be indicative of 
an increase in premature deaths, a disproportionate decrease in old-age mortality, or both 
things at the same time (Gillespie et al 2014). All these phenomena are a cause of 
legitimate ethical concern – particularly when the social patterning in mortality is 
attributable to preventable causes. Several recent studies indicate that looking at 
differences in group life expectancies alone (i.e. disregarding within group inequalities) 
can lead to the elaboration of unfair or misinformed policies (see Sasson (2016), 
Brønnum-Hansen (2017), Permanyer et al (2018)). 
In 2000, the release of the World Health Report (WHO, 2000) sparked an intense debate 
among those who fostered a group-based approach (i.e. comparing average differences 
across pre-determined social groups, see Braveman et al 2000a,b) and those who took the 
individual as the basic unit of analysis (see Gakidou et al 2000). The former complained 
that the World Health Report 2000 decision of focusing on individuals would remove 
equity and human rights considerations from the agenda, while the latter indicated that 
focusing on between-group differences only one would lose sight of important within-
group differences. Since both approaches are interesting in their own right (see chapters 
3 and 4 in Eyal et al 2013) and none of them can claim superiority above the other, in this 
study we integrate them into a coherent whole by considering between-group differences 
as one component of total between-individual variation in a population. 
 
Longevity and lifespan variation 
Classical health transition theories suggest that longevity increases go in tandem with a 
transformation of the mortality distribution characterized by a concentration of deaths 
around the modal age at death, with both the mean and modal age at death increasing 
(Kannisto 2000, 2001). In this line, the so-called ‘mortality compression’ or 
‘rectangularization hypothesis’ popularized by Fries (1980) postulates that as the 
epidemiological transition unfolds, the human survival curves gradually adopts a 
rectangular shape as life expectancy at birth increases and approaches an upper limit of 
the human lifespan. In the limit, the survival curve would become fully rectangular and 
all deaths would occur at the same age. While some studies suggest that the maximum 
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lifespan of humans is fixed and is unlikely to increase over time (Dong et al. 2016), most 
empirical evidence has shown no evidence of an upper bound to life expectancy, which 
continues to increase unabated (Oeppen and Vaupel 2002, Riley 2005).  
The progressive rectangularization of the survival curve has been observed in several 
high-income countries (see Wilmoth and Horiuchi 1999, Shkolnikov, Andreev and Begun 
2003). In the majority of cases, increasing longevity is associated with low lifespan 
disparities when one considers the entire range of ages at death (Vaupel et al. 2011). Yet, 
several studies have noted that restricting our attention to selected age ranges, the 
relationship between longevity and lifespan variability weakens, and even reverses. For 
the US, Myers and Manton (1984) found that while the relationship between life 
expectancy and lifespan inequality across the entire age range was negative, the 
relationship turned positive when the age at death distribution was bottom-truncated at 
the age of 60. Nusselder and Mackenbach (1996), Robine (2001) and Engelman et al. 
(2010) found similar patterns for other highly industrialized countries. In the same 
context, Edwards and Tuljapurkar (2005) found stagnating – rather than the expected 
declining – trends in lifespan variability when bottom truncating the lifespan distribution 
at the age of 10. While the selection of specific age ranges in the study of mortality 
compression has been criticized on grounds of arbitrariness (Robine 2001:187), several 
authors suggest that studying variability measures conditional upon survival to a certain 
age (i.e. exploring the so-called ‘conditional’ age-at-death distributions) is a promising 
avenue of research that can reveal unexpected patterns in adult mortality that are 
otherwise concealed by unconditional measures (Kannisto 2001, Engelman et al. 2010). 
As longevity increases and larger fractions of the population survive to more advanced 
ages, it becomes important to go beyond the analysis of mortality across the entire age 
range and focus our attention on some of its subsets. Rather than sticking to a particular 
age range, in this paper we document global trends in overall, adult and elderly lifespan 
variability.  
The failure of the rectangularization hypothesis to explain recent trends in conditional 
lifespan variation measures gradually lead researchers to propose alternative scenarios of 
human mortality, like the so-called ‘mortality  translation’ or ‘shifting mortality model’. 
This alternative hypothesis suggests that central longevity indicators will continue to 
increase while the age-at-death distributions retain their shape as they shift towards more 
advanced ages (Bongaarts and Feeney 2003, Bongaarts 2005, Canudas-Romo 2008). So 
far, the compression and translation scenarios have been investigated in low-mortality 
settings, so it remains to be investigated how useful they are to describe trends in lifespan 
variability across and within world countries. While the mortality compression scenario 
might characterize the experience of some groups of countries during a certain period of 
time, the mortality translation could better describe other countries’ experience during 
alternative time periods. 
If the mortality compression hypothesis were true for the entire humanity (i.e. in the world 
as a whole), one should necessarily observe a global reduction in the differences in age at 
death – not only within countries but also between them. Alternatively, if the translation 
6 
 
hypothesis were the dominant explanation, one should observe a stagnation in lifespan 
inequality indicators in tandem with increasing longevity indicators. Yet, the current 
evidence to test such hypotheses at a global scale is sketchy and incomplete. In general, 
unconditional length of life inequality within countries has tended to decrease as longevity 
increases (Smits and Monden 2009, Vaupel et al 2011). Yet, Engelman et al (2010) report 
increases in lifespan variability among the elderly within a group of high-income 
countries. As regards between-country variation, some cross-national studies report 
worldwide convergence in life expectancy levels between the 1950s and the late 1980s 
(Goesling and Firebaugh 2004, Moser et al. 2005). Unfortunately, the spread of 
HIV/AIDS in Africa and the collapse of Communism contributed to reverse this favorable 
trend. Lastly, the evidence on global trends in lifespan inequality is particularly 
scarce[[[Endnote#2]]]. Using life tables from 180 countries, Edwards (2011) shows that 
the world inequality in length of life diminished between 1970 and 2000. In line with the 
previous two studies, his findings suggest that between-country inequality increased 
between the two points of time – a matter of concern for public health planners. One of 
the main aims of this paper is to fill this sketchy evidence by exploring the global trends 
in lifespan inequality for the world and its regions during the last 65 years. In our analysis, 
we will explore both unconditional and conditional age-at-death distributions.  
 
Data  
The main data source employed in this paper is the UN World Population Prospects’ 
(WPP) abridged life tables, recording the number of deaths for age groups in 5-year 
intervals (with separate data for infants (age group 0-1) as well as an open-ended 100+ 
interval) for the 1950-2015 time span, again over 5-year periods. We aggregate our 
estimates for both sexes, but data is also available separately for females and males. The 
life tables information is complemented with countries’ population size (also available 
from UN’s WPP), which is needed to calculate the between-country component of global 
lifespan inequality.  
In our analysis we use life tables from 195 countries over 13 5-year time periods (from 
1950-55 until 2010-15), yielding a total of 2535 country-period observations. For 
descriptive purposes, we aggregate the data at different levels, employing the United 
Nations’ regional classification of countries (in the Supplementary Material section we 
show the countries included in each of these regions). Due to the marked impact of the 
HIV-Aids epidemic on length-of-life distributions, we create a separate category for Sub-
Saharan African countries which have had a HIV prevalence of more than 
3%[[[Endnote#3]]].  
While there is excellent data on mortality by age group for high-income countries, data 
are generally more sparse and less reliable for developing countries. Nevertheless, the 
UN population division has assembled a broad data set of country life tables and provides 
a detailed account of the data sources used in the construction of each countries’ set of 
mortality estimates (see https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataSources/). Although the use of 
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model life tables is unavoidable for constructing complete data series for all developing 
countries, all missing country-year combinations are estimated via indirect methods based 
on real data. Therefore, while the accuracy of individual inequality estimates might not 
be perfect for every country in every year, we have strong reasons to believe that the 
broad picture that emerges from them is a faithful portrait of reality. As indicated along 
this paper, our empirical findings square well with those from other renowned studies, 
and the estimates we obtain from the UN WPP are highly correlated with the estimates 
derived from other reputable data sources, like the Human Mortality Database (HMD). 
 
Methods 
Measuring lifespan inequality 
Currently, there is an unsettled debate on whether lifespan inequality should be measured 
using absolute or relative measures (sometimes also referred to as ‘additive’ and 
‘proportional’ measures, respectively). While there is a long tradition in using relative 
inequality measures (partly driven by their massive use among economists because of 
their ability to compare income distributions expressed in different currencies), there is 
no theoretical reason why one should disregard the use of absolute ones when exploring 
differences in length of life. The choice between absolute and relative measures can be 
problematic when assessing trends because the corresponding results do not necessarily 
coincide – an issue that is partly attributable to the explicit dependence of relative 
measures to the values of the mean, which tend to change over time. Very often, relative 
measures might show declines because the mean has increased, while absolute measures 
might remain unaffected – a technical point that should be taken into consideration when 
assessing the validity of ‘compression’ and ‘shifting’ mortality models. Since the choice 
between both kinds of measures is purely normative (Atkinson 2013) and no clear 
consensus seems to be in place, in this paper we use both absolute and relative inequality 
measures.  
In the last few years, several measures have been proposed to measure lifespan variability 
(see Wrycza et al. (2015) for an excellent review of the most widely used measures). We 
have selected specific inequality indices[[[Endnote#4]]] based on their popularity and 
their decomposability properties, which, as we show below, are very useful for the 
purposes of this paper. The first measure we consider is the Theil index, which is a relative 
measure defined as: 
𝑇𝑎 =
1
𝑙𝑎
∑𝑑𝑥 (
𝛼𝑥
𝜇𝑎
) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝛼𝑥
𝜇𝑎
)
𝜔
𝑥=𝑎
          [1] 
where 𝑎 and 𝜔 are the youngest and oldest age intervals taken from the life table, 𝑙𝑎 is 
the radix of the population, 𝜇𝑎 is the average age at death of the population, and 𝑑𝑥 and 
𝛼𝑥 are the life table number of deaths and the average age at death in the age interval 𝑥 
to 𝑥 + 5, respectively[[[Endnote#5]]]. When 𝑎 = 0 we are including the entire lifespan 
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distribution and when 𝑎 = 15 we disregard mortality under 15 and focus on adult 
mortality only. Since both approaches have been used in the literature (see Smits and 
Monden 2009, Edwards 2011), we calculate inequality statistics both for the 
unconditional and conditional distributions. In addition, we also investigate lifespan 
inequality trends when 𝑎 = 65, that is: length of life inequality among the population 
beyond the standard retirement age – an analysis that, so far, has only been conducted in 
a reduced group of high-income countries (see Engelman et al 2010).  
Another of the inequality indices we will consider in the paper is the variance. Using the 
same notation as before it is defined as: 
𝑉𝑎 =
1
𝑙𝑎
∑𝑑𝑥(𝛼𝑥 − 𝜇𝑎)
2
𝜔
𝑥=𝑎
          [2] 
Unlike the Theil index, the variance is an absolute inequality measure. Again, we will 
report the values of this inequality measure for 𝑎 = 0, 𝑎 = 15 and 𝑎 = 65. As a 
robustness check, in a Supplementary Material section we complement our analysis 
showing the results arising from other well-known inequality measures, like the Gini 
index or the coefficient of variation. 
Inequality decompositions 
The reason why we have chosen the inequality indices shown in equations [1], [2] is that 
they are amenable to interesting decompositions that can throw some light on the factors 
behind lifespan variability dynamics. The Theil index and the variance are known for 
their additive decomposability property. This means that global lifespan inequality (i.e. 
variations in age at death around the whole world) can be broken down in two clearly 
interpretable components: the inequality observed within countries and the one capturing 
the differences in average attainment between countries. More formally, additively 
decomposable inequality measures can be written as     
𝐼 = 𝐼𝐵 + 𝐼𝑊 = 𝐼(𝝁1, … , 𝝁𝑛) +∑𝑠𝑐𝐼𝑐
𝑛
𝑐=1
          [3] 
where 𝑛 is the number of countries, and 𝝁𝑐, 𝑠𝑐 and 𝐼𝑐 are the average length of life, the 
population share and the lifespan variability in country 𝑐, respectively. In the last 
equation,  𝐼(𝝁1, … , 𝝁𝑛) represents the inequality that would be observed in a hypothetical 
distribution (sometimes referred to as ‘smoothed distribution’) where the age at death of 
each individual corresponds to the average age at death in the corresponding country (i.e. 
eliminating within-country variations). The second term is a population-weighted average 
of lifespan inequality within countries. The decomposition formula shown in [3] can be 
applied irrespective of the choice of the age range (i.e. both for conditional and 
unconditional lifespan distributions). 
Lifespan variation counterfactuals 
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According to equation [3], global lifespan inequality is a function of three factors: (i) 
population shares (𝑠𝑐), (ii) longevity (𝜇𝑐), and (iii) lifespan variability (𝐼𝑐) in the different 
world countries. To simplify notation and explicitly indicate the dependency of lifespan 
inequality on these three factors, we will schematically rewrite equation [3] as 
𝐼𝑡 = 𝑓({𝒔𝑡}, {𝝁𝑡}, {𝑰𝑡})          [4] 
where the bold letters indicate the country-wise vectors of population shares, longevity 
and within-country inequality, respectively, the subscript ‘𝑡’ now refers to the time period 
and 𝑓 is a function (in the Supplementary Material section, we show the specific 
functional form that equation [4] adopts when applied to the cases of the Theil index and 
the variance). Given the transformations undergone by these three components around 
the world during the last decades, it is interesting to gauge their relative importance in 
assessing changes in overall lifespan inequality over time. To address this issue we use a 
set of counterfactual analyses. We ask what would have happened to total lifespan 
inequality in time period ‘2’ if we held constant one of the three quantities that appear in 
the inequality index at its earlier (time period ‘1’) value and allowed the other two to take 
their later (time period ‘2’) value. In this way, we generate a counterfactual level of 
lifespan inequality in time period ‘2’ and by comparing this with observed inequality in 
time period ‘2’ we can assess the impact of change in the quantity we kept fixed at time 
‘1’ levels on inequality. In this way, we generate the following counterfactual 
inequalities: 
𝐶1 = 𝑓({𝒔1}, {𝝁2}, {𝑰2})           [5] 
𝐶2 = 𝑓({𝒔2}, {𝝁1}, {𝑰2})           [6] 
𝐶3 = 𝑓({𝒔2}, {𝝁2}, {𝑰1})           [7] 
Hence, 𝐶1 indicates the level of lifespan inequality we would observe in time ‘2’ if the 
population shares of each country had remained at its time ‘1’ levels (i.e. in case there 
were no population growth). The second counterfactual measures the level of inequality 
we would observe in time ‘2’ in case the longevity in each country had not changed over 
time. Lastly, 𝐶3 measures the inequality we would observe in time ‘2’ if within-country 
lifespan variation had remained at its time ‘1’ levels. Comparing the values of the 
counterfactuals 𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3 with the observed inequality levels (i.e. 𝐼1 = 𝑓({𝒔1}, {𝝁1}, {𝑰1}) 
and 𝐼2 = 𝑓({𝒔2}, {𝝁2}, {𝑰2}) we can estimate which of the three factors might have been 
more decisive in driving lifespan inequality changes over time. Clearly, the 
counterfactuals shown in equations [5] to [7] can be computed both for conditional and 
unconditional lifespan distributions.  
 
Empirical Findings 
Regional trends 
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In the different panels of Figure 1 we show the evolution of length of life distributions 
between 1950-55 and 2010-15 for the world as a whole and for its different regions. Two 
major changes have occurred when moving from the mid-20th century to the present date. 
First, all distributions have clearly shifted to the right, thus indicating a lengthening of 
lifespan across all regions and for the world as a whole. Second, the shape of the age-at-
death distributions has changed dramatically during the last decades. Back in the 1950s, 
age-at-death distributions were twin-peaked, with a local/global maximum for the first 
age bracket and another local/global maximum at an adult age varying across regions. 
With the unfolding of the epidemiological and demographic transitions, infant mortality 
has decreased dramatically, thus gradually shifting the age at death distributions towards 
the right and increasingly concentrating deaths around their modal age. While these trends 
generally apply to all regions, we observe lots of heterogeneity across them. After World 
War II, the child mortality peak of the age-at-death distributions was higher than the adult 
mortality peak in all world regions except for the group of high-income countries – where 
child mortality levels were already very low in the 1950s. In the following decades, 
improvements in the age-at-death distributions can be observed across the board, but the 
pace of change has not been the same everywhere. In particular, we observe some 
stagnation around the 1990s for Central Asia and in the HIV-stricken countries of Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
Figure 1. Density functions with age-at-death distributions in 1950-55, 1970-75, 1990-
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95, 2010-15 in the world as a whole and its regions. Source: Authors’ elaboration based 
on UN data.  
In the light of the aforementioned transformations, what is the extent of longevity and 
lifespan inequality of the age-at-death distributions shown in Figure 1? The results, 
presented in Table 1, show several patterns that are worth pointing out. As regards 
unconditional lifespan distributions, global and regional life expectancies at birth have 
tended to increase monotonically all over the world (see the first group of columns in 
Table 1). The group of high-income countries has always had the highest longevity 
(regional 𝑒0 of 65 in 1950-55 up to 78.6 in 2010-15). At the other extreme, Sub-Saharan 
Africa is the region with lowest life expectancy all over the period (except in 1950-55, 
when South Asia was the region with the lowest regional 𝑒0). In tandem with these 
increases in longevity, we also observe monotonic declines in unconditional lifespan 
inequality at all moments and in all places (no matter what inequality measure we choose) 
– a finding that aligns well with conceptually related studies (Vaupel et al. 2011). Given 
the strong relationship between life expectancy at birth and unconditional lifespan 
inequality, it is not surprising to find the group of high-income countries and Sub-Saharan 
Africa as the regions with lowest and highest length of life inequality all over the studied 
period.  
Shifting our attention to adult mortality (see the second group of columns in Table 1), we 
find relatively similar trends. Average length of life above age 15 (𝜇15) tends to increase 
virtually in all places at all times, but not as fast as life expectancy at birth. Like in the 
previous case, the groups of high-income and Sub-Saharan African countries are the 
regions with highest and lowest levels of 𝜇15, respectively. Simultaneously, we observe 
generalized declines in adult lifespan variability – albeit at a much slower pace than the 
declines in overall lifespan inequality. There are some exceptions to this generally 
favorable trend in Central Asia and the high-income group around the 1990s (arguably as 
a consequence of the collapse of the Eastern bloc countries included in these regions), 
and in the HIV-stricken Sub-Saharan African countries. For the last group we observe 
some stagnation in the lifespan inequality declines around the 1990s and a slight 
inconsistency in the trends reported by the Theil index and the variance. The regional 
trends in overall and adult lifespan inequality reported in Table 1 cohere roughly with the 
findings reported by Edwards (2011:Figure 3). 
Lastly, the trends in elderly mortality are notably different (see the third group of columns 
in Table 1). As expected, average length of life above 65 (𝜇65) continues to increase in 
the world and most of its regions, but some regions increase faster than others. 
Interestingly, lifespan inequality among the elderly tends to increase over time for the 
world and all its regions (except in Central Asia): no matter what inequality indicator we 
use, we observe unequivocal increases in length of live variability in the older ages. 
Curiously, in contrast to the other lifespan inequality indicators shown in Table 1, the 
levels of lifespan inequality among the elderly across regions are relatively similar. In the 
1950s, the group of high-income countries and Central Asia were the region with largest 
elder lifespan inequality, but in 2010 inequality was largest in Latin America and the 
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Caribbean. These findings – which cohere with the results of Engelman et al (2010) in 
the context of high-income countries – are extremely interesting for several reasons that 
will be discussed later in detail.  
Table 1. Regional indicators of longevity and lifespan inequality for unconditional and 
conditional age-at-death distributions. EAP=East Asia & Pacific, CA= Central Asia, 
HIC=High-income countries, LAC=Latin America & Caribbean, MENA=Middle East & 
North Africa, SA=South Asia, SSH-HIV=Sub-Saharan Africa High HIV, SSA=Other 
Sub-Saharan African countries. Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UN data. 
 
Region Year 
Pop. 
(mio.) 
Full lifespan Ages 15+ Ages 65+ 
𝑒0 Theil Var 𝜇15 Theil Var 𝜇65 Theil Var 
EAP 
1950-55 732.7 44.6 0.298 854.0 59.4 0.049 308.4 74.6 0.0036 40.9 
1970-75 1137.1 60.6 0.141 672.4 68.6 0.027 228.5 77.1 0.0041 49.3 
1990-95 1659.3 68.8 0.077 473.4 73.0 0.021 199.7 78.9 0.0045 56.8 
2010-15 2005.0 74.2 0.038 299.3 75.8 0.018 186.2 80.6 0.0050 65.2 
CA 
1950-55 18.1 55.0 0.215 869.4 66.7 0.037 295.0 77.9 0.0051 62.6 
1970-75 34.4 62.4 0.149 753.7 70.9 0.030 268.5 79.5 0.0055 70.6 
1990-95 51.2 65.3 0.107 597.8 71.0 0.028 254.2 79.4 0.0053 67.8 
2010-15 63.9 70.0 0.057 388.4 72.6 0.023 217.3 79.4 0.0051 65.1 
HIC 
1950-55 854.0 65.0 0.105 576.3 70.6 0.027 235.3 78.4 0.0045 55.4 
1970-75 1046.1 71.1 0.049 350.9 73.2 0.022 212.8 79.6 0.0048 60.6 
1990-95 1184.9 74.3 0.036 305.1 75.5 0.022 226.4 81.5 0.0053 69.7 
2010-15 1275.7 78.6 0.026 256.7 79.2 0.019 214.8 84.1 0.0053 74.8 
LAC 
1950-55 168.7 52.0 0.243 900.1 64.8 0.043 323.4 77.3 0.0044 52.6 
1970-75 288.1 61.6 0.146 728.1 69.7 0.032 273.7 78.8 0.0048 60.6 
1990-95 448.5 68.8 0.078 500.3 72.5 0.029 265.5 80.3 0.0053 69.2 
2010-15 603.4 74.8 0.050 403.5 76.8 0.026 266.1 83.1 0.0061 84.4 
MENA 
1950-55 92.5 43.4 0.387 1058.1 63.5 0.046 327.5 76.5 0.0039 46.2 
1970-75 155.3 55.2 0.228 921.4 68.2 0.034 279.4 77.9 0.0043 52.7 
1990-95 261.2 66.7 0.097 559.7 72.1 0.025 226.6 79.0 0.0044 55.1 
2010-15 383.8 72.5 0.050 361.3 74.9 0.021 203.4 80.4 0.0046 59.5 
SA 
1950-55 477.0 37.2 0.411 880.3 55.4 0.065 367.7 75.0 0.0038 43.8 
1970-75 715.3 49.6 0.274 931.9 64.3 0.041 303.0 76.6 0.0044 52.0 
1990-95 1151.0 59.8 0.156 734.2 68.6 0.031 260.1 77.7 0.0047 57.2 
2010-15 1652.3 68.2 0.083 512.4 72.5 0.026 240.4 79.6 0.0054 68.4 
SSH-
HIV 
1950-55 122.8 37.3 0.428 927.5 56.9 0.064 372.8 74.9 0.0034 39.0 
1970-75 193.5 46.2 0.301 928.7 61.4 0.053 354.2 76.1 0.0039 45.6 
1990-95 334.5 49.7 0.250 878.3 62.2 0.052 360.1 76.8 0.0041 49.2 
2010-15 558.1 58.1 0.149 708.5 65.3 0.046 348.1 78.0 0.0044 54.5 
SSA 
1950-55 58.6 35.8 0.453 922.5 56.4 0.065 373.7 74.8 0.0034 38.6 
1970-75 92.0 43.3 0.346 961.9 60.4 0.057 368.3 76.1 0.0039 45.3 
1990-95 161.8 49.5 0.266 926.8 63.3 0.051 359.7 77.1 0.0041 49.5 
2010-15 290.5 59.2 0.152 730.4 67.1 0.041 325.6 78.2 0.0044 54.2 
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Within countries lifespan inequality (WLI) 
In our previous analysis we have explored the regional trends in longevity and lifespan 
inequality. What can be said about the experience of individual countries? In Figure 2 we 
show a 3×2 scatterplot matrix comparing longevity levels (horizontal axes) against the 
corresponding lifespan inequality indicators (vertical axes) using data from all world 
countries between 1950-55 and 2010-15. The scatterplots in the first, second and third 
rows are based on unconditional, above 15 and above 65 age-at-death distributions, 
respectively. The scatterplots on the first and second columns measure lifespan inequality 
using the Theil index and the variance, respectively. In all cases, we superimpose the 
regional trends for comparative purposes. In general, the trends shown in Figure 2 go in 
line with the ones presented in Table 1. Like in previous studies (Smits and Monden 2009, 
Edwards 2011), we observe a strong negative correlation between life expectancy at birth 
and unconditional lifespan inequality (see first row in Figure 2). As the epidemiologic 
transition unfolds, longevity increases in tandem with decreases in lifespan inequality. 
Interestingly, all regions seem to follow a very similar path of demographic convergence, 
although we observe more cross-country heterogeneity when using absolute measures 
than relative ones.  
Inspecting the relationship between longevity and adult mortality (i.e. disregarding under 
15 mortality) a different picture arises (see second row in Figure 2). In this case, there is 
also a generally negative relationship between the two variables, but it is much weaker 
and the variability across countries and regions is substantially larger than before. Indeed, 
it is possible to identify several countries and regions where the inequality declines stall 
and are followed by extended plateaus (this is the case for High-income countries or Latin 
America and the Caribbean). Once again, there is more between-country and between-
region variability using absolute inequality measures than using relative ones. Lastly, 
examining the relationship between countries’ longevity and lifespan inequality among 
the elderly, we observe diverging trends across the board (see third row in Figure 2): as 
world countries’ longevity increases, the variability in age-at-death distributions among 
the elderly increases as well. The validity of this interesting result does not depend on the 
choice of inequality measure. 
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Figure 2: Scatterplots of longevity (horizontal axis) versus lifespan inequality (vertical 
axis) using the Theil index and the variance for overall, adult and elderly populations. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UN data. 
 
Between country and global lifespan inequalities (BLI and GLI) 
What can we say about the trends in global lifespan inequality? To what extent are these 
trends determined by length of life differences within and between countries? What are 
the contributions of the intra- and inter-country disparities to GLI? Figure 3 plots the 
trends in GLI and its within- and between-country components between 1950-55 and 
2010-15 (the values upon which this Figure is based are shown in the Supplementary 
Material section). In the first row, we show the results corresponding to the entire age-at-
death distributions, while the second and third rows show the results for the distributions 
bottom-truncated at 15 and 65, respectively. When considering unconditional age-at-
death distributions, lifespan inequality has clearly declined over time – a result that does 
not depend on the choice of inequality measure. After six decades, GLI levels have shrunk 
dramatically from 0.26 to 0.06 for the Theil index and from 911.5 to 444.1 for the 
variance. Interestingly, most of the variation in lifespan across world citizens can be 
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attributed to differences occurring within countries. The contribution of the between-
country component for the Theil index goes from 11% in 1950-55 to 7.6% in 2010-15 
(for the variance, it declines from 16% to 10.7%).  
The values of GLI for the adult population are declining as well, but much less than in 
the previous case. The Theil index (resp. the variance) declines from 0.046 to 0.025 (resp. 
from 333.2 to 244.7). In both cases, we observe a clear decline between 1950-55 and 
1980-85 followed by a long inequality plateau. In the case of the variance, we even 
observe some slight increases at the turn of the millennium. These results suggest that the 
expected global compression in adult mortality has stagnated during the last 30-35 years 
approximately. Again, the contribution of the between-country component is relatively 
minor (around 6-12% for the Theil and 6-13% for the variance). Between-country 
inequality in adult mortality decreased between 1950-55 and 1970-75, increased between 
1970-75 and 2000-05 and declined again from 2000-05 until 2010-15. As regards the 
levels of GLI for age-at-death distributions above 65, we observe the opposite trend. 
During the last six decades, lifespan inequality among the world elderly has increased 
from 0.0044 to 0.0055 for the Theil index and from 52.6 to 72 for the variance. Once 
again, these global differences can be mainly attributed to the disparities occurring within 
countries. The within-country component of global lifespan inequality among the elder 
has been increasing during the whole period, while the between-country component has 
declined between 1950-55 and 1970-75 and started increasing unabated from 1970-75 
until 2010-15. 
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Figure 3. Global lifespan inequality between 1950-55 and 2010-15 using the Theil index 
and the variance (left and right columns, respectively) for overall, adult and elderly 
populations. Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UN data. 
Counterfactual analysis 
During the last six decades, the world has undergone major socio-demographic 
transformations. Both the population size and the rate of increase of longevity have varied 
considerably across countries. In addition, the shape of lifespan distributions changed 
substantially over time. In this swiftly changing context, it is important to evaluate what 
of these explanatory factors have been more decisive in driving changes to GLI levels. 
For that purpose, we have run several counterfactual analyses. Using equations [4]-[7], 
we compare the real trends of GLI with the ones that would have been observed had some 
of its subcomponents (countries’ population shares, longevity and lifespan variability) 
remained constant over time. Table 2 reports such counterfactual trends, both for the Theil 
index and the variance and for conditional and unconditional age-at-death distributions. 
Considering the entire age range, we can conclude that within-country inequality is the 
strongest determinant of the observed declines in GLI (see counterfactual 𝐶3). Had 
within-country inequality remained at its 1950-55 levels, GLI levels would have been 
much higher than the observed ones (i.e. from the “true” 0.0629 for the Theil in 2010-15 
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up to 0.3036, and from the “true” 444.1 for the variance in 2010-15 up to 868.9). At the 
other extreme, had population shares remained at their 1950-55 levels, global lifespan 
inequality would be slightly smaller as it is today (see counterfactual 𝐶1). Hence, even if 
population growth per se has contributed to widen the global lifespan distribution, its 
effect has been quantitatively small. Somewhere in between, we observe that the effect 
of longevity on GLI depends on the choice of inequality measure. For the Theil index, 
changes in longevity have slightly deterred further declines in GLI (i.e. fixing longevity 
at its 1950-55 levels, GLI would have reached 0.049 rather than the observed 0.06), while 
the opposite effect is found for the variance (see counterfactual 𝐶2). The counterfactual 
analyses applied to the age-at-death distributions bottom-truncated at the age of 15 are 
qualitatively very similar to the previous ones (see central rows in the two panels of Table 
2). Lastly, the results for the distributions truncated at 65 suggest that neither population 
growth nor longevity changes have had an important effect in driving GLI trends. Once 
again, lifespan inequality trends within countries seems to be the major factor behind the 
observed GLI trends. Had within country inequality levels remained fixed at their 1950-
55 levels, GLI levels among the elderly would have barely changed during the last sixty 
years. 
Summing up, the empirical evidence presented here suggests that the changes in global 
lifespan inequality have been mainly driven by changes in within-country lifespan 
variability and, to a much lesser extent, by longevity trends across countries. Population 
growth has played a minor role in this process. 
Panel A: Theil counterfactuals  
Year 1950-
55 
1960-
65 
1970-
75 
1980-
85 
1990-
95 
2000-
05 
2010-
15 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 0.2629 0.2183 0.1571 0.1216 0.1028 0.0827 0.0629 
𝐶1 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)  0.2153 0.1504 0.1126 0.0922 0.0713 0.0520 
𝐶2 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝜇)  0.2126 0.1443 0.1071 0.0878 0.0684 0.0497 
𝐶3 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑇𝑤)  0.2664 0.2693 0.2782 0.2881 0.2970 0.3036 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 (15+) 0.0466 0.0407 0.0316 0.029 0.0277 0.0275 0.0249 
𝐶1 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)  0.0403 0.0307 0.0277 0.0263 0.0254 0.0225 
𝐶2 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝜇)  0.0400 0.0305 0.0277 0.0264 0.0258 0.0227 
𝐶3 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑇𝑤)  0.0464 0.0454 0.0467 0.0479 0.0497 0.0500 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 (65+) 0.0044 0.0046 0.0046 0.0047 0.005 0.0052 0.0055 
𝐶1 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)  0.0046 0.0047 0.0049 0.0051 0.0053 0.0056 
𝐶2 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝜇)  0.0046 0.0047 0.0049 0.0051 0.0052 0.0055 
𝐶3 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑇𝑤)  0.0044 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041 0.0042 0.0042 
Panel B: Variance counterfactuals 
Year 1950-
55 
1960-
65 
1970-
75 
1980-
85 
1990-
95 
2000-
05 
2010-
15 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 911.5 860.8 744.9 650.3 593.0 525.5 444.1 
𝐶1 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)  856.3 727.8 621.3 555.0 478.1 392.9 
𝐶2 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝜇)  862.9 794.4 709.5 655.2 588.6 526.1 
𝐶3 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑤)  912.7 870.1 867.5 872.4 879.6 868.9 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (15+) 333.2 309.6 264.4 254.6 251.5 257.9 244.7 
𝐶1 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)  307.7 260.5 248.1 245.1 246.4 231.2 
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𝐶2 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝜇)  314.6 289.5 278.6 273.7 272.2 265.2 
𝐶3 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑤)  330.1 312.6 317.4 322.9 335.2 333.3 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (65+) 52.6 55.2 56.5 59.1 63.0 67.0 72.0 
𝐶1 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)  55.5 57.9 61.7 66.1 69.9 74.9 
𝐶2 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝜇)  54.8 58.8 61.0 64.2 67.3 71.2 
𝐶3 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑤)  52.8 48.6 48.4 48.6 49.2 50.1 
Table 2. Counterfactual analyses for the Theil index (Panel A) and the variance (Panel 
B). Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UN data. 
 
Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this paper, we document for the first time global trends in lifespan inequality from the 
1950s to the present day. Our findings indicate that the extent of worldwide lifespan 
variability depends largely on the range of ages we are taking into account. When 
considering the entire age-at-death distributions, we observe a sustained decline in 
lifespan variability in the world and its regions between 1950-55 and 2010-15. Such 
concentration in the age-at-death distributions goes hand in hand with generalized 
increases in life expectancy at birth – a finding that squares well with related findings 
reported in previous studies (Smits and Monden 2009, Vaupel et al 2011, Edwards 2011). 
When the focus shifts to adult mortality (i.e. considering ages above 15), we also observe 
declines in global lifespan variability, but the evidence is not as compelling as before. 
While there are clear signs of sustained decline between 1950-55 and 1970-75, from the 
last year onwards we observe the emergence of inequality plateaus and even trend 
reversals not only in some specific regions like the Eastern European countries, the HIV-
stricken countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean, but 
also in the world as a whole. These results are in line with the findings of Edwards and 
Tuljapurkar (2005) reporting adult lifespan inequality plateaus for a selected group of 
highly industrialized countries. Most of these adverse changes have taken place in spite 
of the generalized increases in longevity among the adult population. Lastly, focusing our 
attention on mortality trends among the elderly (i.e. ages above 65), we observe increases 
in lifespan inequality across all countries, regions, and in the world as a whole. Again, 
such changes have occurred against a backdrop of generalized mortality reductions 
among the elderly. 
Decomposing global lifespan inequality levels in its within- and between-country 
components, we observe that most of the world variability in ages at death can be 
explained by differences occurring within countries. Depending on the inequality measure 
and the period we choose, the within-country component explains around 85% and 95% 
of the total variation (Smits and Monden 2009 and Edwards 2011 report analogous 
contributions within that range). This suggests that traditional narratives in global health 
disparities focusing on international variations in life expectancy (e.g. Goesling and 
Firebaugh 2004, Moser et al. 2005) neglect the major source of lifespan inequality: the 
one that takes place within countries. This is precisely the component that has experienced 
the most dramatic changes during the last six decades. Indeed, our counterfactual analyses 
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suggest that the observed changes in global lifespan inequality can be largely attributable 
to the changes in within-country lifespan distributions, while the contribution of 
increasing longevity and differential population growth have played a relatively minor 
role. While the between-country component is relatively small, it does not mean it is 
irrelevant. Even if between-country inequality in life expectancies at birth declined 
unabated from 1950-55 onwards, the cross-national inequality in the mean age at death 
among adults (i.e. deaths occurring beyond the age of 15) declined between 1950-55 and 
1970-75, increased between 1970-75 and 2000-05, but resumed its downward trend until 
2010-15. The description given in Edwards (2011) for the period between 1970 and 2000 
fits well with our findings, which provide a longer and more nuanced view of the recent 
trends in international health inequality. Lastly, between-country inequality in the mean 
age at death among the elderly declined between 1950-55 and 1970-75 but started 
increasing from the last period until the present day – a matter for concern for 
international public health planners. 
What do these findings tell us about the dynamics of human mortality? For a long time, 
researchers have debated which scenario best describes the future of mortality 
(particularly in low-mortality settings): adult mortality compression – where gains in life 
expectancy go in tandem with reductions in lifespan variation – or shifting mortality – 
where age-at-death distributions are translated to older ages while retaining their original 
shape (Canudas-Romo 2008). Inspecting the evolution of the different longevity and 
lifespan inequality indicators studied in this paper, one finds some support for the 
compression-rectangularization hypothesis popularized by Fries (1980). Indeed, 
unconditional lifespan inequality indicators tend to decrease with increasing longevity 
across all countries, regions and in the world as a whole. Yet, if life expectancy were 
really approaching a biological limit to human lifespan, one would expect the variations 
in age-at-death among the elderly to decrease with further increases in longevity – the 
opposite to what we actually observe across all countries, regions, and in the world as a 
whole. As suggested by Canudas-Romo (2008), it might well be the case that some 
countries initially follow the compression mortality model and gradually move towards 
the shifting mortality scenario.  
The increase in lifespan variability among the elderly was previously investigated in a 
selected group of highly industrialized countries (Engelman et al 2010). According to the 
authors of that study, the systematic increases in longevity alter the health profile of 
survivors in fundamental ways: advances in medicine, socio-economic conditions and 
public health planning have facilitated that frailer individuals reach more advanced ages, 
thus increasing the heterogeneity in health profiles among the elderly. Interestingly, it 
turns out that such mechanisms might have been operating not only in high-income 
settings, but also across all world countries and regions (irrespective of their stage in the 
demographic or epidemiological transitions). 
Sources of lifespan inequality 
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What factors might be driving these remarkable trends in lifespan inequality? As regards 
the determinants of international health inequalities (i.e. differences in longevity between 
countries), researchers have advanced several explanations. In an attempt to overcome 
the limitations of Omran’s epidemiological transition theory (Omran 1971), Vallin and 
Meslé (2004, 2017) put forward the framework of ‘divergence-convergence cycles’. 
According to these authors, health transitions can be seen as a succession of  cycles 
composed of divergence periods (generated by revolutionary health innovations, like 
eradication of infectious diseases, or the cardiovascular revolution), followed by the 
convergence that ensues when laggard countries adapt and catch up with the forerunners. 
Indeed, the non-monotonic trends observed in adult and elderly lifespan inequality 
between countries (see middle and bottom panels in Figure 3) fit well with that 
description. Very often, the diffusion of knowledge and the adoption of new technologies 
are listed among the key drivers of international health convergence. Yet, the evolution 
of such cycles can be suddenly interrupted when socio-economic, political or other 
external shocks disrupt them for any reason. In this regard, the collapse of the Eastern 
Block and the spread of HIV/AIDS among Sub-Saharan African countries have been held 
responsible for the global increase in international health disparities around the 1990s 
(Goesling and Firebaugh 2004). Lastly, socio-economic differentials can be another key 
factor that might explain longevity variations across countries. In this line, the increasing 
cross-country disparities in elderly longevity might be partially explained by countries’ 
unequal access to increasingly expensive technologies that further prolong the lifespan of 
elderly populations. 
As shown before, most of global lifespan inequality changes have taken place within 
countries. The fundamental factor that has contributed to reduce countries’ lifespan 
variability is the reduction in infant mortality. This decrease has been extensively 
documented elsewhere (e.g. Liu et al 2012, Liu et al 2015) and can be largely attributed 
to the use of cheap and widely available treatments, like the use of oral rehydration and 
antibiotics. Among adults and the elderly, within-country disparities in lifespan are often 
associated with the existence of socio-economic gradients. The positive association 
between socio-economic status (SES) and adult health and survival is well-established 
(Davey Smith et al., 1994; Ross and Wu, 1995). To illustrate, higher-educated individuals 
are, through their higher income, more able to afford food, clothing and accommodation, 
have jobs that entail fewer health risks, are more engaged in healthy life styles and better 
informed to use health services and new medical treatments (Hummer and Lariscy 2011, 
Pincus and Callahan, 1994). In this regard, a collection of recent studies suggests a clear 
patterning of longevity and lifespan variability in countries’ SES groups along the 
following lines. On the one hand, researchers have often found diverging longevity trends 
across SES groups, with the socially advantaged ones benefiting more than the 
rest[[[Endnote#6]]] (see left panel in Figure 4). On the other hand, a handful of studies 
suggest that (i) there is a negative gradient between SES and lifespan inequality (i.e. lower 
socio-economic groups tend to have higher levels of lifespan inequality), and (ii) the 
gradient becomes steeper over time because of the decrease (resp. increase) in lifespan 
variability among high (resp. low) SES groups[[[Endnote#7]]] (see right panel in Figure 
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4). Overall, these findings suggest the emergence of divergent health dynamics across 
SES groups within national borders (at least in the context of high-income countries). 
 
Figure 4. Within country changes in longevity and lifespan inequality across SES groups 
over time. Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Since the levels and trends in global lifespan inequality are mostly attributable to the 
variations occurring within countries, one might wonder whether the SES health 
patterning depicted in Figure 4 applies as well for the world as a whole. In such global 
setting, low SES groups could naturally correspond to low-income countries and vice-
versa. Therefore, one would like to know whether (i) poor countries benefit less than the 
rich ones from generalized longevity gains, and (ii) lifespan inequality increases in poorer 
countries and decreases in richer ones. These issues are investigated in Figures 5 and 6. 
Figure 5 plots countries’ GDP per capita in 2010 against their longevity levels in 1950-
55 and in 2010-15. In the upper panel, longevity is measured with life expectancy at birth, 
while in the middle and lower panels it is measured with the average length of live above 
15 and 65 respectively. As can be seen, poorer countries have made larger improvements 
than richer ones in terms of life expectancy at birth (albeit starting at a lower level), so 
we observe convergence across countries (the slope of the best-fit line declines from 
0.132 in 1950-55 to 0.083 in 2010-15, a statistically significant difference). When 
considering differences in adult mortality, the results are slightly different (see middle 
panel in Figure 5). Here, all countries increase their average length of adult life by 
approximately the same amount – irrespective of their economic level in 2010 – so we 
observe neither convergence nor divergence (the slope of the best-fit line goes from 0.18 
in 1950-55 to 0.16 in 2010-15, a statistically insignificant difference). Lastly, the lower 
panel in Figure 5 shows that richer countries have increased their average length of life 
above 65 more than their poorest counterparts, that is: we observe international 
divergence in longevity gains among the older ages (the slope of the best-fit line increases 
from 0.38 in 1950-55 to 0.52 in 2010-15, a statistically significant difference). Hence, 
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whether or not poor countries benefit more than the rich ones from generalized longevity 
gains crucially depends on the part of the age-at-death distribution we are looking at. 
 
Figure 5. Scatterplot with countries’ GDP per capita in 2010 vs life expectancy at birth 
(upper panel), average length of life above 15 (middle panel) and above 65 (upper panel) 
for the years 1950-55 and 2010-15. Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UN data. 
In Figure 6 we show several scatterplots comparing countries’ GDP per capita levels in 
2010 against several indicators of lifespan inequality in 1950-55 and in 2010-15 (Theil 
index and the variance applied to unconditional and conditional age-at-death 
distributions). While none of the scatterplots coincides exactly with the lifespan inequality 
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patterning suggested in the right panel of Figure 4, some of them have much in common. 
When using the variance for the unconditional and above 15 age-at-death distributions, 
we can see how the gradient goes in the expected direction and becomes steeper over time 
(i.e. lifespan inequality is lower and reduces quicker among high-income countries; see 
right-top and right-middle scatterplots). Yet, we do not reach the same conclusion when 
lifespan inequality is measured with the Theil index. In that case, lifespan inequality is 
lower among richer countries but decreases at a slower pace (see left-top and left-middle 
scatterplots) – a trend that is influenced by the increases in the mean of the distributions 
over time. Interestingly, the relationship between income level and lifespan inequality is 
reversed when focusing our attention on the ages above 65 (see bottom scatterplots in 
Figure 6). As opposed to what has been observed within countries’ SES groups (i.e. 
Figure 4), it turns out that richer countries have more lifespan inequality among the 
elderly than poorer ones. According to the Theil index, countries’ lifespan inequality 
levels among the elderly are converging, but we reach the opposite conclusion with the 
variance. Summing up, the scatterplots in Figure 6 suggest that when lifespan inequality 
is measured with the variance, richer countries converge faster when considering the full 
lifespan distribution but also diverge faster in elderly mortality. Alternatively, the use of 
relative measures like the Theil index almost invariably lead to the conclusion that poorer 
countries are catching up and approaching the patterns observed among their richer 
counterparts. Such discrepancy is reminiscent of the opposing trends that ensue when 
global income inequality is assessed with absolute or relative measures (see Niño-Zarazúa 
et al 2016). 
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Figure 6. Scatterplot with countries’ GDP per capita in 2010 (horizontal axis) versus 
lifespan inequality (vertical axis) using the Theil index and the variance for overall, adult 
and elderly populations. The 95% confidence intervals for the slope of the best-fit lines 
are the following: (−22.5, −18) in 1950-55 and (−7.4, −5.6) in 2010-15 for the top-left 
panel; (−94.4, −71.3) in 1950-55 and (−70.1, −54.1) in 2010-15 for the middle-left 
panel; (799.6,1300.2) in 1950-55 and (382.6,885.1) in 2010-15 for the bottom-left 
panel; (−0.005,−0.003) in 1950-55 and (−0.006,−0.005) in 2010-15 for the top-right 
panel; (−0.015,−0.011) in 1950-55 and (−0.017,−0.013) in 2010-15 for the middle- 
right panel; (0.039,0.067) in 1950-55 and (0.06,0.09) in 2010-15 for the bottom- right 
panel. Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UN data. 
 
The analysis presented in this paper have some limitations. First, all our findings are based 
on the worldwide life tables provided by the UN Population Division, some of which are 
based on estimated data. The indirect methods that are usually employed to estimate life 
tables based on incomplete information might over-smooth the corresponding age-at-
death distributions – a potential source of downward bias for our lifespan inequality 
estimates. While we acknowledge that such bias might affect our estimates of lifespan 
inequality levels to a certain extent, we content that it is less likely that it affects lifespan 
inequality trends[[[Endnote#8]]], which are the main subject of interest in this paper. In 
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addition, comparing lifespan inequality levels for those countries simultaneously included 
in the UN database and in the Human Mortality Database shows an extremely high level 
of correlation (see Supplementary Material section). Second, the UN life tables are 
constructed up to age 100, while the HMD life tables include ages up to 110, an issue that 
might downwardly bias our lifespan inequality estimates. Once again, robustness checks 
presented in the Supplementary Material section show that this source of bias is negligibly 
small. Third, our counterfactual lifespan inequality analyses might look somewhat crude 
at first sight. Using ceteris-paribus-like arguments, they simply assume that some of the 
three components in our inequality measures can be kept fixed while allowing the others 
to change over time as they actually did, as if they were completely independent entities. 
Despite this limitation, such techniques are very useful to derive first-order 
approximations of complex phenomena that otherwise would be very difficult to model 
– a factor that explains their popularity in demographic studies (e.g. Goesling and 
Firebaugh 2004, Breen and Andersen, 2012, Permanyer et al 2013). Lastly, even if the 
UN data can be disaggregated by sex, we have only reported our findings for the entire 
population for the sake of brevity. Given the well-known longevity differentials among 
women and men, in future work it will be interesting to investigate their implications for 
lifespan inequality, particularly among the elderly. 
Despite those limitations, the results presented in this paper confirm that the study of 
health inequalities should not be limited to the analysis of differences in life expectancy 
across countries. Since most lifespan variability takes place within countries, focusing on 
the trends of central longevity indicators alone one disregards the major source of 
variability, thus potentially arriving at overly simplistic conclusions. During the last 
decades, much progress has been made in increasing longevity while reducing age-at-
death variability across the full lifespan and, to a lesser extent, across adult ages. Yet, we 
now appear to face a new challenge: the emergence of diverging trends in longevity and 
lifespan inequality among the elderly around the globe. While lifespan inequality is 
increasing among the elderly virtually across all world countries, longevity and 
heterogeneity in mortality among the old has increased faster in the richer regions of the 
globe. As larger fractions of the world population survive to more advanced ages, it will 
be necessary that national and international health planners recognize the growing 
heterogeneity that characterizes older populations. 
 
Endnotes 
Endnote#1: For the sake of completeness, we have also experimented with alternative age 
thresholds to define the ‘adult’ and ‘elderly’ groups. Yet, the substantive findings of the 
paper remain unaffected by the choice of alternative thresholds. 
Endnote#2: The study by Smits and Monden (2009) measures global lifespan inequality 
around the year 2000, so it does not allow investigating trends over time. 
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Endnote#3: Data on HIV prevalence stem from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators, which for HIV are based on estimates from UNAIDS. The cut-off at 3% 
corresponds to the top quintile of countries for which data on HIV prevalence is available, 
where prevalence is defined as the percent of the population between ages 15 and 45 
infected with the virus. For countries without data, we assume that prevalence rates are 
below 3%. 
Endnote#4: Like all previous studies on these matters, we use life table methods to 
analyze lifespan inequality. This means that we analyze the distribution of the d_x, rather 
than measuring inequality on observed death counts. This facilitates comparisons across 
populations with very different structures. 
Endnote#5: When ages at death are reported in five-year intervals, we are inevitably 
missing part of the age-at-death variability. In this regard, it is important to highlight that 
(i) in countries where life tables are available for one-year intervals (e.g. those included 
in the HMD), the lifespan inequality estimates based on one-year and five-year intervals 
are very highly correlated (results not shown here but available upon request); and (ii) it 
is very unlikely that this affects the lifespan inequality trends over time. 
Endnote#6: Steingrímsdóttir et al. (2012) and Deboosere et al. (2009) explored longevity 
differentials by educational attainment in, respectively, Norway (from 1961 to 2009) and 
Belgium (from 1991 to 2004). Analogously, Tarkiainen et al. (2012) and Bronnum-
Hansen and Baadsgaard (2012) report differences in life expectancy for different income 
quantiles in, respectively, Finland (from 1988 to 2007) and Denmark (from 1986 to 2014). 
Other studies from the US have reported life expectancy differentials across education 
(Case and Deaton, 2015; Sasson, 2016) and income quantile groups (Chetty et al., 2016). 
While the studies carried out in European countries report increases in longevity across 
all social groups, this is not the case for the US (with the least-educated non-Hispanic 
white women experiencing longevity declines). When this happens, the two curves shown 
in the left panel of Figure 4 cross. 
Endnote#7: Only a few recent papers investigate changes in lifespan variability across 
SES groups over time (Edwards and Tuljapurkar (2005) investigate the SES gradient in 
a single point in time). Sasson (2016) studies the lifespan inequality differences across 
education groups in the US between 1990 and 2010. Van Raalte et al. (2014) investigated 
trends in lifespan variability across occupational groups in Finland from 1971 to 2010 
and Brønnum-Hansen (2017) across income quartiles in Denmark from 1986 to 2014. 
Lastly, Permanyer et al (2018) look at longevity and lifespan inequality differences across 
education groups in Spain between 1960 and 2015. 
Endnote#8: Since the bias attributable to potential over-smoothing of life tables is 
expected to go in the same direction at all times (i.e. downwardly biasing our lifespan 
inequality estimates), it is to be expected that its potentially distorting influence is much 
weaker on lifespan inequality trends. 
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Supplementary Material 
 
Countries’ regional classification (United Nations) 
East Asia & Pacific:  
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Indonesia, Kiribati, 
Korea (North), Korea (South), Lao PDR, Macao, SAR China, Malaysia, Micronesia, 
Federated States of, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, 
Vanuatu, Viet Nam. 
 
Central Asia: 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. 
 
High Income: 
Albania, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, Republic of, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America. 
 
Latin America & Caribbean 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, French 
Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Martinique, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Vincent and Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic), Virgin Islands. 
 
Middle East & North Africa 
Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Egypt, Georgia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Territory, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic 
(Syria), Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. 
 
South Asia: 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Maldives, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo, (Kinshasa), 
Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mayotte, Niger, Reunion, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, United Republic of Tanzania. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa High HIV: 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Equatorial 
Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Decomposition of Global Lifespan Inequality 
The following table shows the levels and trends of global lifespan inequality and its 
decomposition in between-country and within-country inequality (Figure 3 is based upon 
these numbers). 
Theil decomposition of GLI 
Year 1950-
55 
1960-
65 
1970-
75 
1980-
85 
1990-
95 
2000-
05 
2010-
15 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 0.2629 0.2183 0.1571 0.1216 0.1028 0.0827 0.0629 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑤  0.2341 0.1947 0.1449 0.1126 0.0950 0.0756 0.0581 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑏  0.0288 0.0236 0.0122 0.0090 0.0078 0.0072 0.0048 
%𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟 (𝑏𝑡𝑤. ) 10.9 10.8 7.7 7.4 7.6 8.6 7.6 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 (15+) 0.0466 0.0407 0.0316 0.0290 0.0277 0.0275 0.0249 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑤  0.0410 0.0362 0.0298 0.0273 0.0259 0.0249 0.0229 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑏  0.0056 0.0045 0.0018 0.0018 0.0019 0.0026 0.0020 
%𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟 (𝑏𝑡𝑤. ) 12.0 11.0 5.7 6.1 6.7 9.5 8.0 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 (65+) 0.0044 0.0046 0.0046 0.0047 0.0050 0.0052 0.0055 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑤  0.0041 0.0042 0.0044 0.0045 0.0047 0.0048 0.0051 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑏  0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 
%𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟 (𝑏𝑡𝑤. ) 7.6 7.8 3.8 4.7 5.5 6.6 7.6 
 
Variance decomposition of GLI 
Year 1950-
55 
1960-
65 
1970-
75 
1980-
85 
1990-
95 
2000-
05 
2010-
15 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 911.5 860.8 744.9 650.3 593 525.5 444.1 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑤  766.6 722.4 659.6 578.9 528 461 396.6 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑏  144.9 138.4 85.3 71.4 65.0 64.5 47.5 
%𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟 (𝑏𝑡𝑤. ) 15.9 16.1 11.5 11.0 11.0 12.3 10.7 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (15+) 333.2 309.6 264.4 254.6 251.5 257.9 244.7 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑤 288.4 271.1 247.4 237.2 232.7 230.7 222.9 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑏 44.8 38.5 17.0 17.4 18.8 27.2 21.8 
%𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟 (𝑏𝑡𝑤. ) 13.4 12.4 6.4 6.8 7.5 10.5 8.9 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (65+) 52.6 55.2 56.5 59.1 63.0 67.0 72.0 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑤 48.7 51.0 54.3 56.3 59.5 62.6 66.5 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑏 4.0 4.3 2.2 2.8 3.5 4.4 5.5 
%𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟 (𝑏𝑡𝑤. ) 7.5 7.7 3.9 4.8 5.5 6.6 7.6 
Table A1. Theil and variance decompositions of Global Lifespan Inequality over time for 
the full age-at-death distribution, the deaths above 15 and above 65. Source: Authors’ 
elaboration based on UN data. 
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Computing the counterfactuals. 
In order to compute the counterfactuals shown in equations [5], [6] and [7], we need to 
write the Theil index and the variance in an appropriate form that explicitly shows the 
dependency of these measures on the following three factors: (i) population shares (𝑠𝑐), 
(ii) longevity (𝜇𝑐), and (iii) lifespan variability (𝐼𝑐). We start with the Theil index. 
Assuming we have a list of 𝑛 countries (indexed by 𝑐), it is well-known that the Theil 
index at time 𝑡 can be written as  
𝑇𝑡 =∑𝑠𝑐,𝑡
𝜇𝑐,𝑡
𝜇𝑡
𝑙𝑛 (
𝜇𝑐,𝑡
𝜇𝑡
)
𝑛
𝑐=1
+∑𝑠𝑐,𝑡
𝜇𝑐,𝑡
𝜇𝑡
𝑇𝑐,𝑡
𝑛
𝑐=1
         [𝐴1] 
The first part in equation [A1] is the between-country component (which is obtained 
assuming all individuals in each country die at the same age, so there is no within- country 
variation) and the second one is the within- country component (which is a weighted sum 
of the within-country inequalities). Observing that global average age at death is equal to 
the population-weighted sum of country-specific average age at deaths, 𝜇𝑡 = ∑ 𝑠𝑐,𝑡𝜇𝑐,𝑡
𝑛
𝑐=1  
the additive decomposition of the Theil index (shown in [A1]) for time ‘𝑡’ can be 
rewritten as: 
𝑇𝑡 =∑𝑠𝑐,𝑡
𝜇𝑐,𝑡
∑ 𝑠𝑐,𝑡𝜇𝑐,𝑡
𝑛
𝑐=1
𝑙𝑛 (
𝜇𝑐,𝑡
∑ 𝑠𝑐,𝑡𝜇𝑐,𝑡
𝑛
𝑐=1
)
𝑛
𝑐=1
+∑𝑠𝑐,𝑡
𝜇𝑐,𝑡
∑ 𝑠𝑐,𝑡𝜇𝑐,𝑡
𝑛
𝑐=1
𝑇𝑐,𝑡
𝑛
𝑐=1
         [𝐴2] 
In equation [A2] we explicitly see how the Theil index in time ‘𝑡’ can be written as a 
function of countries’ population shares (𝑠𝑐,𝑡), longevity (𝜇𝑐,𝑡), and lifespan 
variability (𝑇𝑐,𝑡). 
As regards the variance, it is also well-known that it can be written as 
𝑉𝑡 =∑𝑠𝑐,𝑡(𝜇𝑐,𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡)
2
𝑛
𝑐=1
+∑𝑠𝑐,𝑡𝑉𝑐,𝑡
𝑛
𝑐=1
          [𝐴3] 
This is the additive decomposition of the variance. The first part in equation [A3] is the 
between-country component and the second one is the within- country component (which 
is a weighted sum of the within-country inequalities). After simple algebraic 
manipulations, the last equation can be written as 
𝑉𝑡 =∑𝑠𝑐,𝑡𝜇𝑐,𝑡
2
𝑛
𝑐=1
− 𝜇𝑡
2 +∑𝑠𝑐,𝑡𝑉𝑐,𝑡
𝑛
𝑐=1
          [𝐴4] 
Once again, since 𝜇𝑡 = ∑ 𝑠𝑐,𝑡𝜇𝑐,𝑡
𝑛
𝑐=1 , we can finally rewrite the variance in time 𝑡 as 
𝑉𝑡 =∑𝑠𝑐,𝑡𝜇𝑐,𝑡
2
𝑛
𝑐=1
− (∑𝑠𝑐,𝑡
𝑛
𝑐=1
𝜇𝑐,𝑡)
2
+∑𝑠𝑐,𝑡𝑉𝑐,𝑡
𝑛
𝑐=1
          [𝐴5] 
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This way, we have written the global variance as a function of the three ingredients we 
were looking for: the vector of country-specific population shares (𝑠𝑐,𝑡), variances (𝑉𝑐,𝑡) 
and longevity levels (𝜇𝑐,𝑡). 
 
 
Robustness checks 
To check the robustness of our empirical findings, we have performed different 
consistency tests. First, we have recalculated all our findings using well-known inequality 
measures other than the Theil index and the variance. Second, we have investigated 
whether or not the fact of working with life tables up to age 100 (rather than the value of 
110 available in the HMD life tables) can downwardly bias our results.  
1. Use of alternative inequality measures 
Are our findings robust to the choice of alternative inequality measures? To check the 
robustness of our empirical findings, we will use other well-known inequality measures. 
One of them will be the family of Generalized Entropy measures GE(θ), which includes 
the Theil index as a particular case when 𝜃 = 1. It is defined as 
GE(𝜃) =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
𝑙𝑎
1
𝜃(𝜃 − 1)
∑𝑑𝑥 [(
𝛼𝑥
𝜇𝑎
)
𝜃
− 1]
𝜔
𝑥=𝑎
   𝑖𝑓  𝜃 ≠ 0,1
1
𝑙𝑎
∑𝑑𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝜇𝑎
𝛼𝑥
)
𝜔
𝑥=𝑎
  𝑖𝑓  𝜃 = 0
1
𝑙𝑎
∑𝑑𝑥 (
𝛼𝑥
𝜇𝑎
) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝛼𝑥
𝜇𝑎
)
𝜔
𝑥=𝑎
  𝑖𝑓  𝜃 = 1
               [𝐴6]               
The choice of different values of 𝜃 give more emphasis to different parts of the 
distribution2. In Table A2, we show the regional trends in GE(θ) when θ=0 and θ=2. In 
addition, Table A2 shows the regional trends in lifespan inequality when using the Gini 
index and the coefficient of variation, which are defined as follows: 
𝐺 =
1
2𝑙𝑎2𝜇𝑎
∑∑𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑦
𝜔
𝑥=𝑎
|𝛼𝑥 − 𝛼𝑦|
𝜔
𝑥=𝑎
          [𝐴7] 
 
𝐶𝑉 =
√𝑉𝑎
𝜇𝑎
          [𝐴8] 
 
                                                          
2 Lower values of 𝜃 are associated with greater sensitivity to inequality at the lower tail of the distribution 
(i.e. among children and young individuals), and higher values of 𝜃 place more weight to inequality among 
the elderly. When 𝜃 = 0 we obtain the so-called ‘mean log deviation’ (MLD) and when 𝜃 = 2, GE(2) is 
ordinally equivalent to the squared coefficient of variation. 
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The results shown in Table A2 indicate that our findings are highly robust when using 
other inequality indices. Even if the inequality levels inevitably change when using 
alternative measures, the differences across regions and over time are preserved. No 
matter what inequality index we use, we observe generalized declines in age-at-death 
inequality for the complete lifespan, weaker declines (and even some trend reversals) 
when focusing on adult mortality, and generalized increases among the elderly. 
  
2. Upper limit of the life table 
To assess the robustness of our findings to the use of abridged life tables at age 100, we 
revisit our analysis with data from the Human Mortality Database (HMD) which contains 
life table up to age 110 for a limited numbers of (mostly high-income) countries. We find 
that, considering the full population of ages 0 to 110, the impact of lumping ages 100-110 
together in a single category is very small: it amounts to less than 0.01 percent on average 
for all measures, with the smallest changes occurring for the Gini coefficients (which, as 
opposed to the other measures employed in the analysis, is not sensitive to the top-, but 
rather to the middle of the distribution). The largest percentage change observed across 
all measures, countries, and years is still only 0.5 percent and occurs for variance of the 
country with the highest life expectancy in the entire dataset, Japan, in the 2010-2015 
time period. Naturally, if the population is restricted to older subpopulations, the impact 
of abridgment is larger, but still negligibly small: for the 65+ population, the changes on 
our inequality measures are all lower than .01 percent on average. Given that the countries 
in the HMD are among those with the highest life expectancies worldwide, the effects of 
abridging life tables at age 100 can be expected to be even smaller for less developed 
countries where only a very small part of the population survives above age 100 even in 
the more recent years. We therefore conclude that the use of abridged life tables has 
virtually no impact, neither qualitatively nor quantitatively, on the results obtained in this 
paper.   
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  Full lifespan Ages 15+ Ages 65+ 
Region Year GE(0) GE(2) Gini CV GE(0) GE(2) Gini CV GE(0) GE(2) Gini CV 
EAP 
1950-55 0.7969 0.2154 0.3691 0.6564 0.0579 0.0437 0.1652 0.2955 0.0035 0.0036 0.0462 0.0850 
1970-75 0.4546 0.0926 0.2221 0.4303 0.0324 0.0241 0.1183 0.2195 0.0041 0.0041 0.0507 0.0908 
1990-95 0.2710 0.0507 0.1555 0.3185 0.0252 0.0187 0.1025 0.1934 0.0045 0.0045 0.0535 0.0952 
2010-15 0.1199 0.0275 0.1152 0.2344 0.0213 0.0162 0.0955 0.1802 0.0050 0.0050 0.0562 0.0999 
ECA 
1950-55 0.4900 0.0987 0.2310 0.4442 0.0357 0.0262 0.1233 0.2289 0.0044 0.0044 0.0527 0.0940 
1970-75 0.2197 0.0461 0.1526 0.3036 0.0294 0.0221 0.1132 0.2104 0.0046 0.0047 0.0542 0.0965 
1990-95 0.1726 0.0414 0.1483 0.2879 0.0317 0.0242 0.1199 0.2200 0.0049 0.0049 0.0560 0.0992 
2010-15 0.0972 0.0297 0.1269 0.2436 0.0285 0.0220 0.1137 0.2095 0.0053 0.0052 0.0578 0.1021 
HIC 
1950-55 0.3558 0.0718 0.1937 0.3790 0.0336 0.0248 0.1202 0.2228 0.0045 0.0046 0.0537 0.0955 
1970-75 0.1981 0.0426 0.1458 0.2918 0.0276 0.0207 0.1093 0.2036 0.0049 0.0049 0.0558 0.0990 
1990-95 0.1071 0.0282 0.1191 0.2373 0.0244 0.0184 0.1021 0.1916 0.0053 0.0053 0.0580 0.1025 
2010-15 0.0635 0.0200 0.1005 0.1999 0.0201 0.0152 0.0921 0.1746 0.0054 0.0052 0.0578 0.1025 
LAC 
1950-55 0.7201 0.1691 0.3210 0.5815 0.0520 0.0385 0.1534 0.2773 0.0043 0.0043 0.0519 0.0931 
1970-75 0.4844 0.0994 0.2333 0.4458 0.0372 0.0275 0.1272 0.2346 0.0046 0.0046 0.0540 0.0962 
1990-95 0.2633 0.0559 0.1711 0.3343 0.0353 0.0261 0.1233 0.2283 0.0051 0.0052 0.0572 0.1017 
2010-15 0.1492 0.0375 0.1398 0.2739 0.0323 0.0236 0.1165 0.2173 0.0061 0.0061 0.0625 0.1104 
MENA 
1950-55 1.1240 0.3043 0.4370 0.7802 0.0564 0.0415 0.1597 0.2880 0.0039 0.0039 0.0494 0.0888 
1970-75 0.7129 0.1570 0.3039 0.5604 0.0438 0.0318 0.1371 0.2521 0.0041 0.0042 0.0510 0.0911 
1990-95 0.3063 0.0600 0.1730 0.3464 0.0305 0.0222 0.1121 0.2109 0.0043 0.0044 0.0524 0.0933 
2010-15 0.1647 0.0341 0.1270 0.2613 0.0240 0.0177 0.0987 0.1879 0.0045 0.0045 0.0532 0.0944 
SA 
1950-55 1.0375 0.3185 0.4536 0.7982 0.0768 0.0607 0.1990 0.3485 0.0038 0.0039 0.0484 0.0884 
1970-75 0.7927 0.1913 0.3427 0.6185 0.0498 0.0369 0.1499 0.2715 0.0043 0.0045 0.0524 0.0943 
1990-95 0.4986 0.1051 0.2411 0.4585 0.0380 0.0278 0.1278 0.2359 0.0047 0.0048 0.0545 0.0975 
2010-15 0.2819 0.0567 0.1703 0.3367 0.0312 0.0233 0.1165 0.2160 0.0054 0.0055 0.0588 0.1047 
SSH-HIV 
1950-55 1.0868 0.3611 0.4796 0.8498 0.0765 0.0588 0.1948 0.3430 0.0033 0.0034 0.0455 0.0828 
1970-75 0.8855 0.2586 0.4067 0.7192 0.0680 0.0506 0.1784 0.3180 0.0038 0.0039 0.0489 0.0882 
1990-95 0.7151 0.1900 0.3448 0.6165 0.0614 0.0450 0.1668 0.3001 0.0041 0.0041 0.0508 0.0909 
2010-15 0.4383 0.1045 0.2455 0.4571 0.0502 0.0362 0.1471 0.2692 0.0044 0.0044 0.0527 0.0938 
SSH 
1950-55 1.0505 0.3336 0.4621 0.8168 0.0754 0.0575 0.1922 0.3392 0.0034 0.0035 0.0458 0.0834 
1970-75 0.7973 0.2172 0.3707 0.6591 0.0639 0.0470 0.1710 0.3067 0.0039 0.0039 0.0492 0.0887 
1990-95 0.6779 0.1781 0.3343 0.5968 0.0622 0.0466 0.1708 0.3052 0.0041 0.0042 0.0509 0.0913 
2010-15 0.4174 0.1050 0.2497 0.4583 0.0552 0.0408 0.1584 0.2857 0.0044 0.0045 0.0531 0.0946 
Table A2. Lifespan inequality using different indicators across world regions between 1950-55 and 2010-15. Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UN data.
